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Pty Ltd [2014] SGCA 64Misconduct and the 
Division of Matrimonial Assets: Clarification 
from the Court of Appeal Chan Tin Sun v Fong 
Quay Sim [2015] SGCA 2  
 
Should the fact that a wife had previously poisoned her husband with arsenic 
result in any reduction in her share for the division of matrimonial assets when 
the marriage ends in divorce? Following the appeal lodged by the husband 
in Chan Ting Sun v Fong Quay Sim [2014] 3 SLR 945, the Court of Appeal has 
now clarified in Chan Ting Sun v Fong Quay Sim [2015] SGCA 2 that extreme 
spousal misconduct can and should lead to a reduction in that spouse’s share of 
matrimonial assets. This appears to be the first local Court of Appeal judgment 
that has made such an express pronouncement on this issue. 
 
Shortly after the High Court judgment was rendered, it was observed here that 
the broadness of s 112(2) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) 
means that it is “possible to include misconduct – or more specifically for 
present purposes, extreme misconduct – as a factor for consideration”: Chen 
Siyuan, “Misconduct and the Division of Matrimonial Assets: Chan Ting Sun v 
Fong Quay Sim [2014] SGHC 97” (4 August 2014) . The Court of Appeal noted 
this possibility as well in its judgment. However, whereas the High Court was 
of the view that some nexus must exist between the misconduct and the 
contributions of either spouse before any share of matrimonial assets can be 
reduced, the Court of Appeal concluded that such a nexus is only relevant to the 
question of establishing the respective direct and indirect contributions; if there 
is extreme misconduct that fundamentally undermines the co-operative 
partnership and harms the welfare of the other spouse, a second step needs to 
be taken in that a negative value ought to be ascribed to the share of 
matrimonial assets of the misconducting spouse so as to achieve a just and 
equitable division. Two important observations were made in support of this 
conclusion: 
1.  Pursuant to ss 24 and 25 of Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (c 18) (UK), 
English courts are given the power to adjust property holding between 
spouses by having regard to spousal misconduct if the misconduct is such 
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that it would be inequitable for the court to ignore it. Although s 112 of the 
Women’s Charter is worded differently, the overriding consideration in both 
jurisdictions is that of achieving equitability. Therefore, on the level of 
generality and first principles, the English position can provide guidance on 
this issue. 
2. Although the English approach to the division of matrimonial assets has for 
the larger part of history not been that of community of property as it is in 
Singapore, more recent jurisprudence do bear the hallmarks of a regime 
based on the conferred community of property approach. In any event, 
under English case law (for instance, Bateman v Bateman [1979] Fam 25 
and Evans v Evans [1989] 1 FLR 351), it is clear that a negative value will be 
ascribed to the contribution of the spouse guilty of misconduct if such 
misconduct is extreme. Some of those cases also contained analogous facts 
(one spouse physically attacking the other in some form). Therefore, on the 
level of specificity, the English position can also provide guidance on this 
issue.     
 
Accordingly, while the wife’s misconduct did not warrant an award of no share 
of the matrimonial assets, the Court of Appeal deemed it appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case to apply a 7% reduction to High Court’s award so as 
to ascribe a negative value to the wife’s conduct.  
 
As a preliminary observation, local cases involving spousal misconduct as 
extreme as this are rare, and this probably explains why the Court of Appeal 
sought recourse to the English statutes and case law on family law. And as much 
as it was not really necessary to do so (given the broad language in s 112(2) of 
the Women’s Charter and the statutory mandate given to the courts to achieve 
equitability on the facts of each case), Singapore now has an unequivocal 
precedent from its apex court that extreme misconduct of a spouse can result 
in a reduction of the share of matrimonial assets. However, although the Court 
of Appeal took the view that it differed from the High Court as to the effect 
extreme misconduct should have on the share of matrimonial assets, a closer 
reading of the High Court judgment may reveal otherwise.  
 
First, it is suggested (see [21] of the High Court judgment) that the High Court 
Judge was aware that misconduct could, in certain circumstances (but without 
stating what they were save to imply the threshold was not met on the facts), 
lead to a reduction in the share of matrimonial assets. It is further suggested 
(see [22] of the High Court judgment) that it is possible for contributions to be 
reduced to some extent as a result of misconduct (though the actual word used 
was “negate”). It is also noteworthy that the High Court Judge had, in effect, 
ascribed some negative value by reducing the sum of maintenance that the wife 
would otherwise have received. Indeed, it is not uncommon for maintenance 
sums to be adjusted due to uncertainties in the division of matrimonial assets 
and vice versa, but this aspect of the High Court judgmentwas not discussed 
along the same lines in the judgment by the Court of Appeal.  
 
Nonetheless, in so far as the High Court Judge had justified the reduction 
principally on the basis that s 114(2) of the Women’s Charter (which is about 
the maintenance of wives and former wives) expressly permitted him to for 
maintenance cases (while s 112(2) did not, at least expressly), the Court of 
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Appeal was right in clarifying that extreme misconduct of similar or greater 
scale can and should result in a deduction of the share of matrimonial assets in 
future cases, even if s 112(2) is largely silent as to whether misconduct can be a 
factor. Of course, it is likely to be rare for such cases to emerge again, given that 
(as noted by both the High Court and Court Appeal) the court’s default position 
remains that of avoiding the assigning of blame and the minute scrutiny of the 
parties’ conduct. 
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